Much of the evidence provided for the asymmetry thesis comes in the form of correlations between partisanship/ideology and beliefs in one or a few conspiracy theories. However, the relationships identified may be due to the specific conspiracy theories under investigation rather than “bottom-up” psychological asymmetries between left and right. To interrogate the asymmetry thesis, we examine the relationship between political orientations and a wides range of conspiracy theory beliefs. Figure 1 displays Pearson correlations between beliefs in 52 conspiracy theories and both partisanship and ideological self-identifications.
Fig. 1 Pearson correlations between beliefs in conspiracy theories and partisan and ideological self-identification. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals, two-tailed tests Full size image
These data were collected across eight national surveys fielded between October 2016 and May 2021.Footnote 2 All surveys were fielded by either YouGov, as part of the annual Cooperative Congressional Election Study, or Qualtrics, and all samples, which vary in size from 1,000 to 2,023 respondents, were designed to be representative of the U.S. population based on age, sex, race, and educational attainment; see the online appendix for additional information about the sociodemographic composition of each sample, sampling procedures, and other details.
We compiled a set of conspiracy theories that vary in their topical domains (e.g., health, science, politics), accused conspirators (e.g., partisan and non-partisan groups and figures, “the government”), alleged activities (e.g., causing direct harm, undermining democracy, covering-up vital information), salience (e.g., the activities of the Rothschild family versus the current COVID-19 pandemic), and level of specificity (e.g., explicitly identifying the conspirator versus positing a more ambiguous conspirator or group). All items meet the standard definition of “conspiracy theory” described above. Both partisanship and ideological self-identification are operationalized using the familiar seven-point measures coded such that greater values correspond to stronger Republican/conservative identification.Footnote 3 If individuals on the right are asymmetrically predisposed to adopting conspiracy theory beliefs, then we should consistently observe positive, statistically significant correlations between conspiracy theory beliefs and partisan and ideological identities across Fig. 1.
Figure 1 reveals that both the direction and magnitude of the correlations between conspiracy theory beliefs and partisanship/ideology vary considerably across conspiracy theories. When the conspiracy theory implicates actors associated with the political left in wrongdoing (e.g., Birther), or are endorsed by Republican and conservative elites (e.g., Global Warming Hoax), Republicans/conservatives exhibit greater levels of belief than Democrats/liberals (see upper third of Fig. 1). Likewise, when the conspiracy theory implicates actors associated with the political right (e.g., Koch Brothers World Control), or are endorsed by Democratic and liberal elites (e.g., Trump is a Russian Asset), Democrats/liberals exhibit greater levels of belief than Republicans/conservatives (lower third of Fig. 1). We also observe that many conspiracy theories find equal support among the left and right. Online appendix Figure A1, which shows the percentages of respondents on the right and left believing in each conspiracy theory shown in Fig. 1, also reveals parity in the proportion of believers across the political spectrum.
Our results regarding two specific conspiracy theories deserve additional emphasis. First, those on the left and right equally express belief in the general theory that “Regardless of who is officially in charge of governments and other organizations, there is a single group of people who secretly control events and rule the world together.” This question captures a sentiment that is presumably foundational to many specific conspiracy theory beliefs; that we observe no difference between left and right may suggest that the psychological bedrock for conspiricism traverses mainstream political orientations. Second, we find political balance in the belief that “The U.S. government is mandating the switch to compact fluorescent light bulbs because such lights make people more obedient and easier to control,” which was fabricated by researchers (Oliver & Wood, 2014). That the right does not exhibit greater levels of belief in this conspiracy theory prompts us to further question whether there is an innate connection between right-wing identification and conspiracy theory beliefs.
While our intention is to test the asymmetry thesis, specifically, we note that other research has found that extremists––those who identify with the most extreme left/right categories of political identity measures––are more likely than moderates to exhibit conspiracy beliefs (Imhoff et al., 2022). Such a pattern would manifest as a nonlinear, parabolic relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs. Of course, correlations (like the ones presented in Fig. 1) are only capable of deciphering linear relationships. Whereas some nonlinear functional form may be the “correct” model—although this, too, is in contention, (Enders & Uscinski, 2021; van der Linden et al., 2021)—our goal is not to provide the “best” model of each conspiracy belief, but to detect asymmetries. Even if some nonlinearity was present, correlation coefficients would still capture left–right asymmetries should they exist (this applies to all analyses presented below). Regardless, an investigation of potential nonlinear relationships suggests that our empirical strategy is appropriate; in the appendix, we provide evidence that the relationships we are interested in tend to be linear.
Moving Beyond the US
Thus far, we found that the observed relationship between beliefs in various conspiracy theories and political orientations in the U.S. is dependent on the specific conspiracy theories in question. Still, an examination of the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy theory beliefs across a wide range of socio-political contexts can provide further clarity and demonstrate the role of political context. If there is an innate connection between right-wing ideology and conspiracy theory beliefs, we should observe greater support for conspiracy theories among those on the right across countries, regardless of variation in political and economic systems, social (in)equality, racial and ethnic composition of the populace, and many other factors.
To extend our test of the asymmetry thesis in this way, we examine the correlations between a seven-point measure of left–right ideologyFootnote 4 and 11 conspiracy theory beliefs across 20 countries that span six continents (total n = 26,416), which are presented in Fig. 2.Footnote 5 All surveys were conducted by YouGov between July 30–August 24, 2020, who constructed the samples to be representative of each country’s population based on available census records. Questions were approved of and translated by YouGov and their partners in each country. Additional details about each survey, including sociodemographic information, appear in the appendix. Asking about the same 11 conspiracy theories that address topics traversing socio-political contexts (e.g., AIDS, COVID-19) allows us to examine the impact of context on the relationship between ideology and conspiracy theory beliefs, providing additional tests of the asymmetry thesis under different conditions.
Fig. 2 Pearson’s correlations between beliefs in conspiracy theories and left–right ideological self-identification across 20 countries. Horizontal bands represent 95% confidence intervals, two-tailed tests Full size image
Remarkably, not a single conspiracy theory investigated in Fig. 2 exhibits correlations with consistently positive or negative signs (regardless of statistical significance) across all 20 countries. For example, the 9/11 conspiracy theory finds significantly more support among those on the left in 8 of the 20 countries and is not significantly related to ideology in the remaining 12. Even the Global Warming Hoax belief, a feature of the political right in the U.S., finds significantly more support among the left in 5 countries (Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) and exhibits no correlation with ideology in 2 others (Hungary and South Africa). Despite some ideological “balance” across Fig. 2, most correlations are quite weak, suggesting a lack of ideological discrepancy altogether. Indeed, the average correlation––across all conspiracy theory beliefs and countries––is a meager 0.03 (ranging from − 0.05 for 9/11 Truther to 0.10 for Global Warming Hoax).
To be sure, there are many possible explanations for the variability we observe across conspiracy theories and countries. Our goal, however, is not to provide post-hoc explanations for this variation, but rather to leverage it towards additional tests of the asymmetry thesis. While some countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy) and some conspiracy theories (e.g., Global Warming Hoax, COVID is a Myth) provide more support for the asymmetry thesis, others exhibit the opposite pattern. The relationship between political ideology and conspiracy theory beliefs appears to be dependent on both the details of the conspiracy theories and socio-political context.
Altogether, we find that symmetry comes in two forms. First, there are conspiracy theories that prove to be systematically attractive to those on either the left or right. Second, many conspiracy theories find similar levels of support (or lack thereof) across the political aisle. We do not argue, nor do our data demonstrate, that beliefs in any given conspiracy theory are or should be symmetric across political predispositions––this is entirely dependent on the details of the conspiracy theory, and perhaps the context in which beliefs were assessed.
Of course, one might protest that the patterns depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 are artifacts of the conspiracy theories we chose to examine and, indeed, they would be correct! However, as much would be the case for any study of specific conspiracy theories. This critically important point explains the discrepancies among previous studies: substantive inferences are heavily dependent on which conspiracy theories are considered. Inferences about the fundamental nature of conspiracism should not be made from patterns in a single or small number of conspiracy beliefs, even though precisely such generalizations are commonplace in the conspiracy belief literature.
Decisions about which conspiracy theories to poll and analyze are always fraught with challenges. For example, one could criticize Finding 1 by claiming that some of the conspiracy theories we employed are more plausible (e.g., believable, evidenced, or rational) than others, and that this variability in plausibility is correlated with ideology or partisanship. However, judgements of this nature (Douglas et al., 2022), even among otherwise discerning researchers, are colored by motivated reasoning. It should not be a surprise that a Democrat, for example, would believe that the conspiracy theories that other Democrats believe in are more plausible than the conspiracy theories that Republicans believe in. Nevertheless, the conspiracy theories at the top and bottom of Fig. 1 are different from each other and not necessarily comparable (though, this is again a matter of subjective judgment). We, therefore, point readers to the conspiracy theories in the middle of Fig. 1. These are particularly important because the correlations with partisanship and ideology––or the lack thereof––are inconsistent with the asymmetry thesis (i.e., the right should be more likely than the left to believe these conspiracy theories should the asymmetry thesis be correct). For example, partisanship and ideology are not correlated with beliefs in conspiracy theories about the JFK assassination, the MMR vaccine, the Holocaust, GMO’s, Fluoride, cellphones, AIDS, pharmaceutical companies, government mind control, and lightbulbs.
Furthermore, even though Finding 1 involves more conspiracy theory beliefs than previous studies, our findings remain an artifact of which conspiracy theories researchers investigate because there is no “correct” or “representative” set of conspiracy theories that researchers should employ. This problem motivates the analyses that follow: an experiment which holds constant all but the partisanship of the accused conspirators in a set of conspiracy theories, as well as an analysis of the general predisposition toward conspiracy thinking. These analyses are attempts to avoid the trappings of individual conspiracy theories.