In two studies conducted with large samples of American partisans drawn (N = 2200) from a nationally representative panel, we found that both Democrats and Republicans highly valued democratic characteristics. While this finding, which is consistent with prior research5, offers room for optimism about the health of American democracy, it also raises an important question: given high levels of individual support for democratic principles, why do so many partisans engage in anti-democratic behavior and tolerate it by their elected representatives24,25? Our results provide one potential explanation for this paradox. By demonstrating that American partisans severely underestimate out-partisan support for bedrock democratic principles, we suggest that these intergroup misperceptions may independently jeopardize Americans’, and especially Republicans’, commitment to democracy.
A core contribution of this research is our theorizing about the nature of democratic norms, with implications for thinking about democratic norm erosion. Rather than conceptualize democratic norm strength as an aggregate of individually held beliefs about the importance of democratic principles, we join others who have recently begun conceptualizing democratic norms as the aggregate of individuals’ perceptions of how much others, and particularly out-partisans, value democratic principles11. If norm strength was measured using individually held opinions, our data would present a rather optimistic take. However, by focusing on perceptions—themselves a constitutive quality of social norms—our data demonstrate that democratic norm strength—and potentially practice—may be severely undermined by a partisan psychology of “us” vs. “them” thinking.
Possible causal mechanisms
A natural question is why Democrats and Republicans underestimate each other’s support for Democratic principles. One explanation, grounded in social identity theory15, is that the same psychological processes that lead partisans to overestimate affective and ideological polarization influence intergroup perceptions more broadly18,19,20.
A second explanation may be that partisans infer beliefs and values from actions, even if these actions are not representative of all party members. For example, Democrats who witnessed some Republicans storm the Capitol in the aftermath of the 2020 election have good reason to suspect that anti-democratic values are normative among some Republican voters, who continue to vote for elected representatives who scholars warn consistently undermine democratic principles2,3. Such perceptions are likely only exacerbated by a hyperpolarized media landscape26, in which members of both parties are constantly exposed to narratives of anti-democratic behavior committed by out-partisans. In such a hyperpolarized landscape, even asymmetric anti-democratic attitudes could fuel symmetric misperceptions and kickstart a downward spiral.
A third related explanation is that anti-democratic behavior committed by partisan elites may trickle down to influence perceptions of partisan citizens22, whose votes ultimately give power to elites themselves. Our finding that partisans attribute more anti-democratic values to elites from their opposing (and even own) party provides some support for this explanation. However, given the asymmetric nature of some of our findings—which demonstrate a stronger relation between biased perceptions and support for anti-democratic behavior by Democrats and Republicans—this account does not, on its own, explain the symmetrical nature of observed biased misperceptions.
A fourth explanation is that political campaigns and political media benefit from exaggerating the threat posed by out-partisans. Political campaigns (and aligned media organizations) must mobilize their supporters to donate funds, get out the vote, attend rallies, and call legislators—all costly activities. Increasingly, they must do so on a national level. More even-handed political media is incentivized to broadcast conflictual, threat-laden content to attract viewers. This creates a kind of escalation. Since voters may become desensitized to threats, the threshold for activation may climb higher and higher, requiring a greater “dose” of outsider threat for mobilization and attention. Future research should aim to test these four possible causal mechanisms.
The present research also contributes to an emerging interdisciplinary literature on the role of inaccurate intergroup perceptions in democratic decline. Notably, prior research demonstrates that correcting inaccurate intergroup perceptions about affective polarization can reduce toxic polarization and even partisan violence21. However, such corrections—which to date have focused on perceptions about affective and ideological polarization—have yet to counteract anti-democratic attitudes27. It is plausible that these interventions may fall short because they have not directly targeted perceptions about democratic values. Our results suggest that democratic erosion may be caused, at least in part, by a misguided fear that out-partisans do not share the same democratic values and, as a result, will not abide by the rules of the game. Thus, one potentially promising intervention strategy would be to directly assure Americans of their opposing party’s robust support for shared democratic principles. We are aware of two not yet published attempts to do so, both of which followed a preprint of an earlier version of this work. One experiment yielded significant but only small effects28, suggesting that, given a hyperpartisan media, anti-democratic behavior by partisan elites, and recent examples of citizens storming the capitol at the behest of their party leader, it may be difficult for an informational intervention to effectively counteract the many forces fueling partisan misperceptions. However, a separate set of studies reported in a recent preprint not only conceptually replicates our general finding that Democrats and Republicans who most fear that out-partisans will subvert democracy are themselves more willing to subvert democratic principles, but also extends this finding by experimentally showing that an intervention correcting inaccurate misperceptions about out-partisans’ commitment to democracy promotes adherence to democratic norms29. Future research is needed to identify what makes some informational interventions more effective than others.
Alternative explanations for our findings
While our research, and emerging complementary work29, suggests that biased intergroup perceptions may help to explain the seeming paradox between Americans’ support for democratic principles and the simultaneous erosion of democratic practice, it is important to consider alternative explanations and the potential for bidirectional processes. We review four non-exhaustive possibilities, each of which deserves independent inquiry.
One alternative explanation could be that negative partisanship30 and affective polarization12 are so strong that they override Americans’ otherwise pro-democratic attitudes. Thus, it is possible that the cross-sectional relation observed in the present research—between misperceptions and anti-democratic attitudes—emerges from a third variable. While this may explain part of our observations, the asymmetrical relation between misperceptions and anti-democratic views, with stronger relations among Republicans than Democratic, suggests that partisan animosity on its own does not offer a full mechanistic explanation. Relatedly, one might ask what causes the asymmetry in the first place? One potential explanation could be that our studies were conducted shortly after the Democrats took control of the presidency and congress, making the stakes much larger for Republicans, who were ousted from political power. This may help to explain why the relation between biased perceptions and support for anti-democratic behaviors was stronger for Republicans in both studies. Nonetheless, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are not able to fully rule out third-variable effects or to confidently identify the source of observed asymmetry. Future experimental and/or longitudinal research is needed to address these questions.
A second alternative explanation for this incongruence may be that partisans have different views about what actions constitute a threat to democratic principles. For example, voter suppression laws are often framed as protecting election integrity. This suggests that proponents of anti-democratic policies may recognize democratic principles’ widespread popularity and market anti-democratic proposals in pro-democratic language. This may help to explain why many Republican voters and elites defended efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election as a way to protect democratic processes. Relatedly, racial animus underlying support for Donald Trump31, as well as racialized conceptions of who is American32, may foster alternative views about how to defend democracy. As a result, anti-democratic behaviors that disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities, such as voter suppression33, can be perversely seen as either protecting American democracy or hurting it, depending on the accuracy of one’s preconceptions. Future research should explore these possibilities.
A third alternative explanation is that pro-democracy views may not be as deeply held as many Americans self-report. For example, it is possible that Democrats or Republicans overestimate the extent to which they and their own party value democratic norms (rather than underestimate how much out-partisans value democratic norms). This could result from social desirability bias34 or stem from a gap between the values individuals hold in abstract and how they put these values into practice. For example, partisans may view democratic principles that they support as fungible and worth sacrificing for competing values, such as power. And for many segments of the population (e.g., White Christians), for whom increasing diversity threatens political power, there may be a newfound tension between pro-democratic views and pro-group views35,36,37,38. This broader context may also help to explain why a willingness to subvert ostensibly held democratic values was higher among Republicans. This question remains ripe for future research.
Fourth, it is also possible that the relation between democratic norm adherence and (mis)perceptions about out-partisans commitment to democracy is bidirectional. That is, just as partisans may be more willing to subvert democratic principles that they hold important if they believe that out-partisans won’t play by the rules, partisans may also seek to downplay out-partisans’ commitment to democracy to justify their own (or their group’s) anti-democratic behavior. Thus, misperceptions may help individuals maintain a positive view of their group and/or serve as a moral license to continue undemocratic behavior.
Democratic strength requires that citizens adhere to—and remove from office elites who violate—bedrock principles of democracy. The maintenance of strong democratic norms ensures that parties have a fair chance to compete for power and that minority rights are protected. While it is important that citizens value democratic principles, doing so may not be enough to ensure that they also uphold such principles in practice. Democratic norm strength requires that partisans from all parties not only personally value democratic principles, but also believe that members of their own and opposing parties do the same. This mutual perception, which itself can be conceptualized as a metric of democratic norm strength, is easily jeopardized in a sectarian political climate marked by a hyper-partisan psychology. Democratic health requires attention to this psychology.